UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

8-29-2011

State v. Watkins Respondent's Brief Dckt. 37906

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Watkins Respondent's Brief Dckt. 37906" (2011). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 2786.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2786

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ID
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
vs.
)
)
VANCE A. WATKINS,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)

NO. 37906

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF CANYON

HONORABLE THOMAS J. RYAN
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
STEPHEN A. BYWATER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ................................................................................ 1
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings ........................ 1
ISSUE ..............................................................................................................4
ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................5
Watkins Has Failed To Show That The District Court's
Curative Instruction Was Insufficient To Cure Potential
Prejudice Caused By A Witness' Statement That There
Had Been A Prior Trial And An Appeal ................................................. 5
A.

lntroduction .................................................................................5

B.

Standard Of Review ................................................................... 5

C.

Watkins Has Failed To Show An Overwhelming
Probability That The Jury Was Unable To Follow
The Court's Curative Instruction And A Strong
Likelihood That The Evidence Was Devastating
To His Case ................................................................................6

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 12
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................... 12

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGE

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 24 (1967) .......................................................... 9
Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987) ........................................................... 7, 8, 10
People v. Fears, 962 P.2d 272 (Colo. App. 1997) .............................................. 11
State v. Endres, 741 S.W.2d 788 (Mo. App. E.D. 1987) ..................................... 11
State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 198 P.3d 128 (Ct. App. 2008) ....................... 6
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 768 P.2d 1331 (1989) ....................................... 7
State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625, 97 P.3d 1014 (Ct. App. 2004) ........................ 7, 8, 10
State v. Keyes, 150 Idaho 543, 248 P.3d 1278 (Ct. App. 2011) ........................... 7
State v. Kuzmichev, 132 Idaho 536, 976 P.2d 462 (1999) ................................... 6
State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 254 P.3d 77 (Ct. App. 2011) .......................... 7, 8
State v. Rodriquez, 106 Idaho 30,674 P.2d 1029 (Ct. App. 1983) ...................... 6
State v. Shepherd, 124 Idaho 54, 855 P.2d 891 (Ct. App. 1993) ......................... 6
State v. Tate, 288 A.2d 494 (R.I. 1972) .............................................................. 10
State v. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418,224 P.3d 485 (2009) ........................................ 1
State v. Weidul, 649 A.2d 318 (Me. 1994) .......................................................... 11

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Vance A. Watkins appeals from his conviction for lewd and lascivious
conduct with a child under the age of 16.

Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
A grand jury indicted Watkins for lewd and lascivious conduct with a child
for having sex with his six-year-old daughter. (#35687 R., pp.17-18; see #35687
Tr. Vol.Ill, p. 31, L. 24 - p. 34, L. 1.) A jury convicted Watkins after a trial.
(#35687 R., p. 121; #35687 Tr. Vol.Ill, p. 248, Ls. 1-16.) On appeal the Idaho
Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had erred in admitting hearsay
testimony establishing foundation for DNA evidence showing Watkins' DNA on
the inside of a condom, both the victim's and Watkins' DNA on the outside of the
same condom, and that Watkins' semen was in the victim's underwear. State v.
Watkins, 148 Idaho 418, 423-27, 224 P.3d 485, 490-94 (2009). 1
remanded for a new trial.

The Court

ld..c at 427, 224 P.3d at 494.

At the new trial, during cross examination based upon testimony given at
the first trial about where he found the used condom, witness Officer Archuleta
referenced a transcript and then asked the trial judge, "can I say that because I

1

The hearsay in question came from the out-of-court statements of lab
technician Kermit Channell to establish "chain of custocfy, Channell's testing
methodology, and to identify the locations on the condom and panties on which
Watkins' and the victim's DNA were found." Watkins, 148 Idaho at 427, 224 P.3d
at 494. At the re-trial Channell testified about these things in person. (Trial Tr.,
p. 377, L. 3 - p. 437, L. 23.)
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was told I can't talk about the prior trial." (Trial Tr., p. 88, Ls. 13-20. 2) The trial
judge asked if Officer Archuleta recalled making a different statement in prior
testimony, to which the officer replied he did not recall making a different
statement and stated he had read "the transcript of the prior trial after the
appeals court." (Trial Tr., p. 88, L. 21 - p. 89, L. 1.)
Although Watkins registered no objection, at that time the court on its own
excused the jury and raised the issue of "the jury [having] been informed that
there [was] a previous trial and an appeal in the case." (Trial Tr., p. 89, Ls. 2-11.)
The district court ultimately concluded that prejudice from the comments about
the prior trial and appeal could be sufficiently cured by an instruction to not
speculate about the results of the trial, and therefore a fair trial could still be had.
(Trial Tr., p. 106, L. 5 - p. 111, L. 9.) The court based its ruling on the finding
that the jury had been informed of a prior trial and appeal, but were not informed
of any conviction. (Trial Tr., p. 107, L. 19 - p. 108, L. 1; p. 109, Ls. 10-13.) The
district court then instructed the jury to not speculate as to the result of the
previous trial. (Trial Tr., p. 115, L. 18 - p. 116, L. 1. 3)
The defense continued its cross examination of Officer Archuleta, wherein
the officer acknowledged that his prior testimony (that he found the condom
discussed at trial in a closed trash bag under some papers) was accurate. (Trial

2

The volume of transcript containing the trial also contains pre-trial motions and
the sentencing. Each segment of the transcript begins with page 1. Citations to
the "Trial Tr.," are therefore to the pages of the actual trial transcript, and not to
portions of the transcript addressing of pre-trial motions or sentencing.
3

The trial court also offered to strike the statements once the jury returned, but
the defense declined this offer. (Trial Tr., p. 112, Ls. 3-14.)
2

. Tr., p. 116, L. 19 - p. 119, L. 20.) The defense subsequently argued that the
victim's DNA could have gotten on the condom while it was in the trash. (Trial
Tr., p. 507, L. 13 - p. 509, L. 14; p. 521, Ls. 9-16.)
The jury returned a guilty verdict. (Trial Tr., p. 532, L. 17 - p. 533, L. 11.)
Watkins filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment. (R., pp. 176-79, 18283.)

3

ISSUE

Watkins states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Watkins' motion for a
mistrial, made after a State's witness revealed that Mr. Watkins had
had [sic] an earlier trial and appeal in this case?
(Appellant's brief, p. 8.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Watkins failed to show that the district court's curative instruction,
instructing the jury to not speculate on the outcome of the prior trial, was
insufficient to cure potential prejudice caused by a witness' statement that there
had been a prior trial and an appeal?
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ARGUMENT
Watkins Has Failed To Show That The District Court's Curative Instruction Was
Insufficient To Cure Potential Preiudice Caused By A Witness' Statement That
There Had Been A Prior Trial And An Appeal

A.

Introduction
The district court concluded that, because there had been no testimony of

a conviction, potential prejudice from the statements that there had been a prior
trial and appeal could be cured by instructing the jury to not speculate about the
results of the prior trial, and therefore a fair trial was still possible and a mistrial
was not necessary. (Trial Tr., p. 106, L. 5 - p. 111, L. 9.) Because there was not
an overwhelming probability that the jury ignored the court's curative instruction
and the fact of a prior trial is not prejudicial, much less that such information is
devastating to the defense, the district court was within its discretion to deny the
a mistrial.

Watkins argues, without addressing the curative instruction and

making the baseless factual claim that the jury was informed that there was a
prior conviction, that there was no harmless error. (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-16.)
Because Watkins does not address the only relevant legal question-whether the
curative instruction was sufficient to preserve the fairness of the trial-he has
failed to show error. If the relevant question is addressed on appeal, the record
supports the district court's determination that the curative instruction did mitigate
any potential prejudice such that the trial was ultimately fair.

B.

Standard Of Review
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that the applicable standard of

review for denial of a mistrial is for an abuse of discretion: "Whether a trial court
5

should grant a mistrial is a matter of discretion. In the absence of an abuse of
discretion this Court will not overturn the trial court's denial of a mistrial." State v.
Kuzmichev, 132 Idaho 536, 544, 976 P.2d 462, 470 (1999) (quotes and brackets
omitted).

The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that calling the applicable

standard of review an abuse of discretion is a misnomer:
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably
exercised his discretion in light of circumstances existing when the
mistrial motion was made. Rather, the question must be whether
the event which precipitated the motion for mistrial represented
reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record. Thus,
where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the
"abuse of discretion" standard is a misnomer. The standard, more
accurately stated, is one of reversible error. [The appellate court's]
focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident that
triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge's refusal to declare a
mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively,
constituted reversible error.
State v. Shepherd, 124 Idaho 54, 57, 855 P.2d 891, 894 (Ct. App. 1993). Under
the standard as articulated by the Idaho Court of Appeals, the appellate court
reviews the full record to determine if the event that triggered the motion for
mistrial "represented reversible error when viewed in the context of the full
record." State v. Rodriquez, 106 Idaho 30, 33, 674 P .2d 1029, 1032 (Ct. App.
1983) (internal quotation omitted).

C.

Watkins Has Failed To Show An Overwhelming Probability That The Jury
Was Unable To Follow The Court's Curative Instruction And A Strong
Likelihood That The Evidence Was Devastating To His Case
"The admission of improper evidence does not automatically require the

declaration of a mistrial." State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 498, 198 P.3d 128,
136 (Ct. App. 2008). "On appeal, [Watkins] has the burden of showing that the
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trial court's refusal to declare a mistrial constituted reversible error."

State v.

Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,601,768 P.2d 1331, 1334 (1989). To do this he must
overcome the presumption that the jury followed the court's curative instruction .

.!!t.;

see also State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625, 631, 97 P.3d 1014, 1020 (Ct. App.

2004); State v. Keyes, 150 Idaho 543, _ , 248 P.3d 1278, 1279-80 (Ct. App.
2011). He can overcome this presumption only if he shows that "there is an
'overwhelming probability' that the jury will be unable to follow the court's
instructions, and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be
'devastating' to the defendant." Hill, 140 Idaho at 631, 97 P.3d at 1020 (quoting
Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 (1987)); see also State v. Norton, 151
Idaho 176, _ , 254 P.3d 77, 94-95 (Ct. App. 2011).
Watkins has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating on appeal an
overwhelming probability that the jury disregarded the district court's instruction
and a strong likelihood that the reference to the prior trial and appeal was
devastating to his defense. Instead of addressing whether evidence of a prior
trial and appeal were prejudicial in light of the curative jury instruction, Watkins
relies on cases holding that evidence of a prior conviction for the same criminal
act is highly prejudicial (while acknowledging that evidence of a prior trial, by
itself, is at least far less prejudicial).

(Appellant's brief, pp. 9-13.)

He then

combines this with his belief that knowledge of a prior trial and appeal "likely led
the jurors to believe that Mr. Watkins had previously been found guilty, by
another jury, for the same crime for which he was on trial in this case" and
asserts the "testimony was so prejudicial as to have undermined Mr. Watkins

7

[sic] right to a fair trial and, thus, required declaration of a mistrial." (Appellant's
brief, pp. 14-15.) Watkins then concludes: "Given the tremendously prejudicial
effect of informing the jury that Mr. Watkins was previously found guilty by a
different jury, it simply cannot be said that the jury's guilty verdict in this case
'was surely unattributable' to Officer Archuleta's testimony." (Appellant's brief, p.
16.)
Watkins' argument fails to meet his appellate burden.

First, Watkins

makes no argument based on the relevant authority, and has therefore failed to
carry his appellate burden of showing an abuse of discretion. Second, Watkins'
argument merely assumes facts contrary to the record and the district court's
findings.

Because his argument is premised upon non-existent facts, it

necessarily fails to meet his appellate burden. Finally, applying the correct legal
standard to the actual facts shows no abuse of discretion in denying a mistrial
based upon the curative instruction given by the court.
To show reversible error in the trial court's denial of a mistrial where, as
here, a curative instruction has been given in response to the presentation of
inadmissible evidence, Watkins must show an overwhelming probability that the
curative instruction was not followed and that the inadmissible evidence was
devastating to the defense. Greer, 483 U.S. at 766 n.8; Norton, 151 Idaho at
_ , 254 P.3d at 94-95; Hill, 140 Idaho at 631, 97 P.3d at 1020. At no point in
his statement of the law does Watkins acknowledge the central role of a curative
instruction in determining whether he ultimately received a fair trial.

(See

Appellant's brief, pp. 9-13.) At no point in his argument does he provide analysis

8

whether evidence of a prior trial and appeal is prejudicial in light of the court's
curative instruction.

(See Appellant's brief, pp. 9-16.)

Rather, Watkins

articulates only the harmless error standard applicable if the court had actually
erred by admitting the inadmissible evidence.

(Appellant's brief, p. 13 (citing

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 24 (1967) (constitutional error must be harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt).) Because Watkins has failed to present authority or
argument addressing the relevant legal standard, he has failed to meet his
appellate burden of showing an abuse of discretion by the trial court.
Second, Watkins' taking as "given" that the jury was informed of his prior
conviction fails to show an abuse of discretion because it is directly contrary to
the record and the trial court's findings. Watkins asserts as fact that the jury was
informed that he had been convicted in the prior trial and relies on that "fact" as
the foundation for his appellate argument. (Appellant's brief, p. 16 ("Given the
tremendously prejudicial effect of informing the jury that Mr. Watkins was
previously found guilty by a different jury .... ").) This "fact" is unsupportable in
the record.

Officer Archuleta mentioned having reviewed the transcript of the

prior trial after the appeal. (Trial Tr., p. 88, L. 13 - p. 89, L. 1.) The district court
found that the jury was informed of the prior trial and appeal but not informed of a
conviction. (Trial Tr., p. 107, L. 19 - p. 108, L. 1; p. 109, Ls. 10-13.) Watkins
does not challenge this finding of fact as clearly erroneous; rather he merely
asserts a completely contrary fact as "given." His argument is directly contrary to
the facts as established by the record.
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Nor is this "given" fact supportable by inferences from the record. Rather
than being "given," his assertion that the jury knew of his conviction and was
therefore prejudiced rests on the assumption that the jury did exactly what it was
told it should not do: speculate on the outcome of the previous trial. (Compare
Tr., p. 115, L. 22 - p. 116, L. 1 ("You are not to speculate as to the result of that
previous trial.").) Watkins' argument that he was prejudiced fails because it is
based on an unsupportable factual claim.
Finally, application of the law to the facts of this case shows no abuse of
discretion by the trial court in denying a mistrial. To overcome the presumption
that the jury followed the instruction Watkins has the burden of showing both an
overwhelming probability that the jury was unable to follow the instruction to not
speculate about the outcome of the prior trial and appeal, and a strong likelihood
that the evidence there had been a prior trial and appeal was devastating to the
defense. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 (1987); State v. Hill, 140 Idaho
625,631, 97 P.3d 1014, 1020 (Ct. App. 2004). Watkins has not even attempted
to meet that burden. Should this Court decide to reach the merits of the district
court's ruling despite Watkins' failure, analysis of the actual facts of this case
under the applicable law shows no abuse of discretion.
As noted above, the jury was informed that there had been a prior trial and
appeal but never informed that there had been a conviction. Although evidence
that a prior trial was held is irrelevant and therefore inadmissible, it is not, of
itself, prejudicial. State v. Tate, 288 A.2d 494, 497 (R.I. 1972) (officer's testimony
that he had possession of evidence except when he brought it to the court
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"during the last trial" was not prejudicial); State v. Endres, 741 S.W.2d 788, 791
(Mo. App. E.D. 1987) (defendant not prejudiced by single mention of prior trial).
Rather, the reference to a prior trial is only prejudicial where the jury may draw
an inference that there has been a prior conviction. See State v. Weidul, 649
A.2d 318 (Me. 1994) (applying rule that jury knowledge of a prior trial is not per
se prejudicial and rejecting claim that references to the prior trial led to inferences
of a prior conviction). The difference between a jury learning of a prior trial and a
prior conviction is therefore "significant."

People v. Fears, 962 P.2d 272, 281

(Colo. App. 1997).
Here the jury learned only of the prior trial and appeal. They did not learn
of any conviction. The court specifically instructed the jury not to speculate about
the outcome of the prior trial. Although jury knowledge of a prior conviction is
prejudicial, knowledge of a prior trial is not itself prejudicial.

Because the jury

would have had to completely disregard the trial court's instruction to conclude
that there had been a prior conviction, there was no prejudice unless the jury did
completely disregard the instruction. There is no reason on the record to suggest
a high probability that the jury did so, and therefore the record supports no
finding that the district court abused its discretion by holding that the curative
instruction was adequate to preserve Watkins' right to a fair trial.
To show an abuse of discretion in the denial of a mistrial Watkins had the
burden of showing an overwhelming probability that the jury disregarded the trial
court's instruction to not speculate about the outcome of the prior trial. He has
made no attempt on appeal to do so, and has therefore failed to meet his burden.
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In addition, his attempt to show error is based on a representation of fact without
support in the record and directly contrary to the uncontested factual finding
made by the trial court.

Finally, because the only way Watkins could have

suffered prejudice was if the jury drew an inference specifically prohibited by the
curative instruction, and because the record shows no high likelihood that the
jury disregarded the instruction, the record shows no abuse of discretion in
denying a mistrial because of the reference to the prior trial.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order
denying a mistrial.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 29th day of August 2011, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
ERIK R. LEHTINEN
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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